We examine the initial public offering (IPO) underpricing phenomenon in Poland using data from the Warsaw Stock Exchange (the main market). In the article we survey historical average IPO underpricing in Europe and outside Europe. We discuss the determinants of the IPO underpricing which is based on asymmetry of information, ownership and control, institutional explanations and behavioural explanations. We discuss the calendar effect and we examine the influence of the January effect on the IPO underpricing. On the Warsaw Stock Exchange in 2005-2011, the IPO underpricing was bigger for companies that debuted in January than for companies that debuted in other months. The empirical results are not statistically significant.
introduction
Initial public offering is one of the methods of raising capital available to companies.
The first listing is, however, related to one of the most widely discussed anomalies in the capital market, i.e. the difference between the offering price and the first-day price. The offering price is estimated in advance for the purpose of the public offering; it is a price at which shares are offered in the primary market. The first-day price, on the other hand, is the market price recorded on the debut day. This price can be set as either an opening or closing price. If the offering price is higher than the first-day price, the stock is considered to be overpriced, if the opposite is true, the stock is considered to be underpriced. Regardless of the period, the IPO underpricing is a much more common phenomenon than overpricing. The IPO underpricing is a problem faced by emerging and developed markets. In the literature on the subject both IPO underpricing and overpricing are measured with the initial return, also known as the first-day return, which is estimated as the ratio of the difference between the first-day price and the offering price to the first-day price. From the financial point of view, the underpricing effect is expressed in the amount of the "money left on the table". Offering underpriced stock is related to opportunity costs as the "money left on the table" is an indirect cost of an IPO 1 .
The next part of the paper provides a literature overview, presents historical results of studies into IPO underpricing both in Poland and across the world, and offers a short description of the Warsaw Stock Exchange. In the second part of the paper the January effect is discussed; the explanations of the underpricing effect are also summarised and classified. Next, in part three, the main hypothesis as well as the data and methodology used in the study are presented.
In part four the results of the study into IPO underpricing in the WSE are discussed and the hypothesis on the impact of the January effect on underpricing is verified. The last part of the paper summarises the findings and conclusions.
ipo underpricing across the world and in poland
In 1963 the US Securities and Exchange Commission began investigating the underpricing phenomenon in the US market 2 . The Commission analysed 1,671 IPOs in the US stock exchange which took place between 1959 and 1961. The results revealed a positive average initial return on investment in the shares offered in the market for the first time. In 79% of IPOs the first-day price was higher than the offering price and the average underpricing exceeded 20%.
In 1967 a similar study into the underpricing phenomenon was carried out for the London Stock Exchange 3 . Here, too, the results provided evidence supporting the occurrence of the underpricing phenomenon among companies offering their shares in the market for the first time, and revealed an average underpricing of 17.2% in the sample. In both the UK and the US studies the underpricing phenomenon was measured with the initial return on IPO based on the closing price. The employment of the closing price was related to an easier access to relevant data for that period. IPO underpricing was also identified in many other studies carried out for a number of other markets for various periods. The average IPO underpricing for companies entering the capital market was estimated at approx. 36.5%, the actual scale of the phenomenon varied with the country and period of analysis. The results of studies into IPO underpricing inside Europe are presented in Table 1 and outside Europe in Table 2 . The results of 50 independent surveys conducted across the world did not reveal the IPO overpricing in any country. The lowest underpricing was reported in Russia -4.2%, and the highest -in Bangladesh, where it reached 285.2%.
Underpricing in the WSE in Poland in the years 1991-1998, according to the study by Jelic and Briston, was estimated at 27.4%. It is noteworthy to point out, however, that even though the researchers employ the same formula to estimate the initial return, the composition of the samples can vary. The results of studies into underpricing in the WSE in the years [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] are presented in Table 3 . 
The origins of ipo underpricing versus the january effect
As soon as IPO underpricing was identified, the researchers made attempts to provide its explanation. As a result, a variety of concepts and theories explaining this phenomenon were developed. The concepts can be grouped depending on whether they are related to the information asymmetry, ownership and control, behavioural finance and institutional explanations.
One of these theories, perhaps the best-known, is "the winner's curse hypothesis" developed and published by Rock 4 . This theory belongs to the group of explanations deriving from the theory of information asymmetry. Information asymmetry in economics describes a situation when one of the parties involved in a transaction is better informed than the other party. It usually implies that the seller is better informed than the buyer. The party which has access to all the available information and is better informed is known as the agent. The other, less informed, party which does not have access to all the information is known as the principal, and has to rely on the better-informed party while making decisions. "The winner's curse hypothesis" assumes that there are two types of investors -well-informed and underinformed. Investors will invest in shares of a company only if their price is lower than the company's fair value. If, however, the price is above the fair value, only underinformed investors will buy the shares. As a result, the demand for the shares will be lower than it would be if both groups of investors were interested in buying them, so it is more probable that the shares will yield a negative return on the first day of trade. Uninformed investors, however, are aware of this fact and will buy the shares only if the expected return on investment is positive. As a consequence, the issuers need to underprice the shares offered so as to attract uninformed investors. Apart from this theory there are many others which attempt to explain underpricing based on the information asymmetry and those that the less prestigious the underwriter, the higher the probability they will be sued, as they are not able to assure proper quality of due-diligence . All these concepts explain underpricing with legal regulations and the structure of the capital market. It is noteworthy to observe, however, that each country has its specific legal framework and structure of the market, so the explanations from this field may only be considered as complementary to other explanations for underpricing.
Another group of explanations covers those related to ownership and control. In many cases the entrance to the capital market is a step towards separation of ownership and control.
As a consequence of such separation, it is managers rather than owners who make operational The occurrence of the January effect is explained with the "tax loss selling hypothesis".
The hypothesis assumes that at the year's end investors sell their shares which yielded losses so as to take advantage of tax benefits while at the beginning of January they repurchase those shares thus driving their prices up. This mechanism is known as the January effect. Another explanation of the January effect is the assumption that professionals who manage portfolios on behalf of their clients are obliged to disclose to them the composition of those portfolios at the end of the year. As a consequence, they sell shares of small unprofitable companies yielding losses only to repurchase them at the beginning of January thus driving their market value.
Yet another explanation of the January effect is related to the inflow of positive information to the market, when at the beginning of the year companies announce their new development plans, restructuring plans and optimistic outlooks for the next year 14 . Another attempt to explain the January effect refers to the remuneration system for portfolio management. The earnings of managers are related to the return on the market index, which is then compared and contrasted to the return on the portfolio at the year-end. In the new year the managers start to reconstruct portfolios thus driving the demand and share prices up 15 .
hypothesis, data and methodology
The January effect, which is induced by increased demand for stock, should also exert an influence on the scale of IPO underpricing. If such an impact can be observed, it will imply that investors should be more willing to buy the shares of companies entering the stock market in January rather than in other months. It means also that the initial return on the stock of companies offering their shares in January should be on average higher than the initial returns for other months. The following hypothesis can, therefore, be formulated:
The initial return on IPOs taking place in January is equal to the initial return on IPOs in other months.
The initial return on IPOs taking place in January is higher than the initial return on IPOs in other months.
In the years 2005-2011, 272 companies in total entered the Warsaw Stock Exchange.
11 of them transferred to the WSE from the CeTO 16 market, 15 transferred from the New Connect market, 22 were listed on at least two markets (dual listing), and 8 decided to enter the WSE without offering their shares. All these companies were excluded from the study, and as a result the final sample comprised 216 companies. Otherwise, an analysis of initial returns for companies which had been previously valued by investors on a different market or did not offer their shares at all would have distorted the results. As a result, these companies were excluded from the sample. The number of companies which comprised the sample as well as the number of IPOs are provided in Table 4 . January  other months  sum  2005  35  3  30  33  2006  38  0  36  36  2007  81  3  59  62  2008  33  0  23  23  2009  13  1  11  12  2010  34  0  23  23  2011  38  2  25  27  Sum  272  9  207  216 Source: own study based on: WSE (2012).
IPO underpricing is estimated with the initial return (I n ) based on closing prices:
Sometimes the stock is offered at different prices for individual and institutional investors.
In this study the offering price (P e ) is defined as the offering price set for individual investors.
The closing price (P d ) is the price of either the shares or -in the case of lack thereof -the rights to shares reported at the closing of the first-day trade session. Verification of the H 0 hypothesis was based on the t-test according to the following formula:
where:
x 1 , S 1 , n 1 -arithmetic mean, standard deviation and size of the first sample, x 2 , S 2 , n 2 -arithmetic mean, standard deviation and size of the second sample.
The critical area of the null hypothesis was based on the t α critical value depending on the alternative hypothesis and the significance level. If the absolute value of the t-statistic is higher than or equal t α then T belongs to the critical area and the null hypothesis should be rejected in favour of the alternative hypothesis, and the probability of type I error, i.e. that the null hypothesis is true, is equal to the α significance level 17 .
results
IPO underpricing, which was observed for various periods in all the analysed markets across the world, was witnessed also on the Warsaw Stock Exchange in the years 2005-2011.
The characteristics describing the phenomenon by individual years are summarised in Table 5 . Figure 1 . During years [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] in January number and value of IPOs was the lowest. The results of the research into underpricing according to the month of the offer are summarised in Table 6 . Comparing to other months the highest median and second highest average underpricing occurred in January. The lowest median and average underpricing occurred in June. Summarised results of the research into underpricing in January and other months in years 2005-2011 are presented in Table 7 . The t statistic estimated according to the above formula equals 1.0172, which is higher than t α , i.e. 2.61 at the α = 0.01 significance level. As a consequence, based on the evidence from the research, the H 0 hypothesis cannot be rejected, which means that it is impossible to confirm the impact of the January effect on the IPO underpricing in the WSE in the years 2005-2011.
Despite higher average underpricing reported for IPOs in January as compared and contrasted to other months, the results of the research are not statistically significant. 
